@inbook{a79d7d8eafe5444fa9aeb0456e6c2e05,
title = "Insider Trading and Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector. New Lessons on the Entrenchment Effect",
abstract = "This paper uses panel data estimation under the assumptions of the agency theory of insider trading to identify the factors enhancing bank insider trading. We conclude that the more entrenched the directors, the less prestigious the bank, the bigger the firm and the lower the charter values for high levels of ownership, the higher the intensity of insider trading activity. Thus, the emerging picture is of a scenario where insider trading activity is triggered by the absence of efficient control mechanisms, either external (regulators control the level of bank capitalization but it is not easy for them to also control other opportunistic behaviors) or internal (shareholders fail to control managers when managers{\textquoteright} stakes are very low or very high).",
author = "{del Brio}, {Esther B.} and Javier Perote and {de Miguel}, Alberto and Gerardo G{\'o}mez",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, Springer International Publishing AG.",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-70007-6_10",
language = "English",
series = "CSR, Sustainability, Ethics and Governance",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = "219--233",
booktitle = "CSR, Sustainability, Ethics and Governance",
}