Insider Trading and Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector. New Lessons on the Entrenchment Effect

Esther B. del Brio, Javier Perote, Alberto de Miguel, Gerardo Gómez

Producción científica: Capítulo del libro/informe/acta de congresoCapítulorevisión exhaustiva

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

This paper uses panel data estimation under the assumptions of the agency theory of insider trading to identify the factors enhancing bank insider trading. We conclude that the more entrenched the directors, the less prestigious the bank, the bigger the firm and the lower the charter values for high levels of ownership, the higher the intensity of insider trading activity. Thus, the emerging picture is of a scenario where insider trading activity is triggered by the absence of efficient control mechanisms, either external (regulators control the level of bank capitalization but it is not easy for them to also control other opportunistic behaviors) or internal (shareholders fail to control managers when managers’ stakes are very low or very high).

Idioma originalInglés
Título de la publicación alojadaCSR, Sustainability, Ethics and Governance
EditorialSpringer Nature
Páginas219-233
Número de páginas15
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 2018
Publicado de forma externa

Serie de la publicación

NombreCSR, Sustainability, Ethics and Governance
ISSN (versión impresa)2196-7075
ISSN (versión digital)2196-7083

Huella

Profundice en los temas de investigación de 'Insider Trading and Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector. New Lessons on the Entrenchment Effect'. En conjunto forman una huella única.

Citar esto